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NOTES 
THE “RATIONAL FEDERALIST”: 
SYNTHESIZING NECESSITY AND 
PROPRIETY IN THE SWEEPING CLAUSE 
SHANE MAGNETTI† 
Today, the United States Supreme Court’s Necessary and 
Proper Clause jurisprudence sits cloaked in a mantle of 
uncertainty.  Beneath this cloak lies a slew of conflicting tests 
which have left scholars befuddled as to the Clause’s true scope 
and meaning.  This confusion has generated feverish debate 
among scholars with differing views of congressional power.  
Unfortunately, within this battleground of competing viewpoints 
lies no clear answer. 
Despite this uncertainty, there can certainly be a more 
pellucid and effective interpretation of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  This Note will argue that flexibility as to what 
constitutes a “necessary” law combined with a rigid standard for 
what makes a law “proper” enables Congress to execute its 
enumerated powers without overreaching.  Part I outlines 
differing scholarly theories as to the legal origins of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  Sections A, B, and C outline the 
theories that the Clause stems from principles of agency law, 
administrative law, and corporate law, respectively.  Section D 
examines the implied powers theory of the Clause’s genesis.  
Next, Part II examines the Supreme Court’s early Necessary and 
Proper Clause jurisprudence—namely McCulloch v. Maryland, 
the seminal case which set the Clause in motion.  Part III 
outlines four different categories of Necessary and Proper Clause 
interpretation that the Supreme Court has recently espoused.1  
 
† Notes and Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review & Journal of Catholic 
Legal Studies; J.D., 2019, St. John’s University School of Law; B.S., 2016, State 
University of New York College at Oneonta. Special thanks to Professor Marc 
DeGirolami for his guidance and to the members of the St. John’s Law Review for 
their dedication and support. 
1 It is important to note that this is not a comprehensive historical examination 
of the Supreme Court’s Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence—such an 
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Section A examines two broad forms: the “Rational Connection” 
approach and the “Chain-link” approach.  Conversely, section B 
examines two narrow forms: the “One-step” approach and the 
“Federalist Restriction” approach.  Finally, Part IV will argue 
that a combination of the “Rational Connection” approach and 
the “Federalist Restriction” is ultimately the soundest 
construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
I. LEGAL ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER 
CLAUSE 
The opacity of the Necessary and Proper Clause’s origin lies 
in the lack of debate over the clause at the Constitutional 
Convention.2  Indeed, records of debates over the clause’s scope 
and meaning at the Convention are scant.3  The clause itself was 
added by the Convention’s Committee on Detail, spearheaded by 
James Wilson—a prominent lawyer from Maryland.4  Yet it was 
not until the pre-ratification debates that the clause generated 
meaningful arguments among the nation’s most eminent legal 
minds.5  The ambiguity shrouding the clause’s roots has inspired 
many legal scholars to ruminate as to its true origins, scope, and 
meaning.  For example, Professors Gary Lawson, Geoffrey P. 
 
inquiry is beyond the scope of this Note. Rather, this Note examines several recent 
Supreme Court cases that address the Clause for the purpose of categorizing its 
interpretational modes. 
2 Professor Randy E. Barnett offers a possible explanation for this lack of 
debate: “if the power to make law was already thought implicit in the enumerated 
powers scheme, then it is not surprising that the Clause would provoke no 
discussion at the Convention.” See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 186–87 (2003). 
3 See Gary Lawson et al., Raiders of the Lost Clause: Excavating the Buried 
Foundations of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY 
AND PROPER CLAUSE 1, 2–3 (2010) [hereinafter ORIGINS]. Moreover, scholars often 
question the accuracy of the historical record itself. Some suggest that early reports 
of the ratification debates are scant, unreliable, and possibly doctored. See Gary 
Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 334 (1993) 
(citing James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the 
Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12–24 (1986)). In fact, early volumes of the 
Annals of Congress “were based on the notes of Thomas Lloyd, whose reportorial 
skills in 1789 were ‘dulled by excessive drinking,’ and whose manuscript was 
‘periodically interrupted by doodling, sketches of members, horses, and landscapes, 
and by poetry.’” Id. 
4 See John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 
1047 (2014). 
5 See Robert G. Natelson, The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, in ORIGINS, supra note 3, at 84, 94. 
2019] THE “RATIONAL FEDERALIST” 143 
Miller, Robert G. Natelson, and Guy I. Seidman contend that the 
“Sweeping Clause” was painted with shades of eighteenth-
century agency, administrative, and corporate law, which 
ultimately give Congress incidental authority to effectuate its 
enumerated powers.6  Conversely, Professor John Mikhail 
suggests that the framers used a different brush—one varnishing 
broad strokes of implied and unenumerated powers stemming 
directly from the all “other powers” provision within the clause 
itself.7  This Part will examine each of these theories in turn. 
A. Origins in Agency Law 
Professor Natelson suggests that the framers intended the 
Sweeping Clause power to be exercised pursuant to fiduciary 
principles of agency.8  The founders’ intent was “to erect a 
government in which public officials would be bound by fiduciary 
duties to honor the law, exercise reasonable care, remain loyal to 
the public interest, exercise their power in a reasonably impartial 
fashion, and account for violations of these duties”9—an idea with 
roots embedded in the Lockean social compact.10  This fiduciary 
ideal permeated the Constitutional Convention.  Several of the 
delegation’s most prominent figures, such as James Madison, 
Alexander Hamilton, John Dickinson, and George Washington, 
all considered government officials to be public trustees, 
servants, and agents of the people.11  Moreover, most of the men 
who drafted the Constitution were either lawyers with personal 
fiduciary experience or businessmen who employed fiduciaries.12  
Therefore, one may safely infer that the drafters were well versed 
in the principles of the fiduciary duty and readily understood its 
implications for government officials.13 
One of the most salient fiduciary duties is the duty to follow 
instructions and remain within authority.  If a fiduciary action 
 
6 See Lawson et al., supra note 3, at 5–6; see also Mikhail, supra note 4, at 1067. 
7 See Mikhail, supra note 4, at 1047. 
8 See Natelson, supra note 5, at 52. 
9 Id. at 53. 
10 Id. (positing that “the government ha[s] a fiduciary obligation to manage 
properly what ha[s] been entrusted to it.”) (citing John Locke, The Second Treatise of 
Civil Government: An Essay Concerning the True Origin, Extent, and End of Civil 
Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 136, at 190 (Thomas I. Cook ed., 
1947) (1690)). 
11 See Natelson, supra note 5, at 55. 
12 See id. at 56. 
13 Id. 
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extends beyond its scope of authority, the reasonableness of the 
action becomes irrelevant.14  This is particularly germane when 
applied to the terms “necessary” and “proper;” if a law is not 
properly within Congress’s jurisdiction to enact, it is irrelevant 
whether the law is “necessary.”15  In both situations, the central 
inquiry is whether the actor in fact has the power to act, and that 
power is often determined by the doctrine of incidental powers. 
In fiduciary relationships, the doctrine of incidental powers 
is instrumental in determining the scope of a fiduciary’s 
authority.16  This doctrine arises from the Quando aliquis maxim: 
“[w]hen someone grants something, he is seen to grant also that 
without which the thing itself cannot be.”17  Here, this means 
that the fiduciary’s power stems from both an explicit grant of 
authority and the implied powers incidental to effectuating that 
authority.18  James Madison applies this maxim to the Necessary 
and Proper Clause in Federalist 44:  
Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no 
doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of 
executing the general powers would have resulted to the 
government, by unavoidable implication.  No axiom is more 
clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the 
end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general 
power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary 
for doing it is included.19 
This indicates that the Necessary and Proper power is an 
ancillary means of using Congress’s other enumerated powers—
no more, no less.  This interpretation is consistent with how the 
maxim applies in fiduciary relationships.  For example, 
incidental to the power to operate as a corporation is the power to 
make bylaws.20  Ultimately, such powers exist whether they are 
expressed or not, since they are incidental to the grant of 
authority.21 
All in all, Professor Natelson’s agency theory blends well 
with the Necessary and Proper Clause—Congress is the agent, 
 
14 See id. at 57. 
15 See infra Part IV.B. 
16 See Natelson, supra note 5, at 60. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison). 
20 See Natelson, supra note 5, at 63. 
21 Id. at 64. (citing the maxim “Expressio eorum quae tacite insunt nihil 
operatur– ‘The expression of those things that are silently inherent has no effect.’”). 
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the people are the principal, and Congress must not exceed the 
authority that the people have granted to it.  Inherent in this 
relationship is Congress’s fiduciary duty to honor the law, respect 
the public interest, and exercise its power according to express 
and incidental grants of authority.22 
B. Origins in Administrative Law 
In addition to Professor Natelson’s agency law theory, 
Professors Gary Lawson and Guy I. Seidman propose an 
administrative law background to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  Since the Constitution is a public law charter, principles 
of public administration help to elucidate means of constitutional 
interpretation.23  One such principle—the “principle of 
reasonableness”—facilitates the application of private agency law 
in a public setting by requiring proportionality and impartiality 
in public administration.24 
The principle of reasonableness posits that delegations of 
authority must be exercised reasonably.25  At its core, it is a 
principle of statutory discretion; in seventeenth-century England, 
it applied generally to all delegated authority to prevent 
arbitrary and unreasonable exercises of power.26  Lawson and 
Seidman theorize that this principle applies to Congress through 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.27  They first note a structural 
anomaly—that no implementational clause is found in Articles II 
or III to enable the President or the Judiciary to take steps 
necessary and proper to implement their respective powers.28  
Rather, Congress alone is granted the power to implement 
Necessary and Proper laws.  Lawson and Seidman suggest a 
reason for this—to avoid an argument that the principle of 
reasonableness applies only to implementational rather than 
legislative power, the drafters thought it necessary to codify such 
a restraint.29  This is achieved through the Necessary and Proper 
 
22 Id. at 53. 
23 See Gary Lawson & Guy I. Seidman, Necessity, Propriety, and 
Reasonableness, in ORIGINS, supra note 3, at 120. 
24 Id. at 120–21. 
25 See id. at 123. 
26 See id. at 124. The principal of reasonableness had been “powerfully restated” 
by English courts prior to the Constitutional Convention. Id. (citing Leader v. 
Moxon, 2 W. Bl. 924 (1781)). 
27 See id. at 135. 
28 See id. at 126. 
29 See id. at 135. 
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Clause, which gives Congress discretion to assist in the 
implementation of laws. 
This theory is consistent with how the Federalists 
represented the Clause to the public prior to its ratification.  For 
example, Alexander Hamilton opined that “the constitutional 
operation of the intended government would be precisely the 
same, if these clauses were entirely obliterated, as if they were 
repeated in every article.”30  If the clause is indeed mere 
surplusage, intended only to authorize those laws which serve 
powers expressly enumerated,31 then Lawson and Seidman’s 
theory fits with Hamilton’s language in Federalist 33.  If 
Congress’s incidental powers would have accrued with or without 
the Necessary and Proper Clause as Hamilton suggests, then it 
necessarily follows that those powers would still be subject to the 
principle of reasonableness, as Lawson and Seidman suggest.32  
In both cases, the clause superfluously codifies the incidental 
powers and limitations already inherent in legislative power. 
Additionally, Lawson and Seidman employ a textual analysis 
to conclude that the Necessary and Proper Clause is an ideal 
vessel for incorporating the principle of reasonableness.  They 
maintain that the term “necessary” requires efficacy, 
measuredness, and proportionality—all core aspects of fiduciary 
law and the principle of reasonableness.33  Moreover, they 
interpret “proper” as describing regard for rights, impartiality, 
and a fixed scope of granted authority.34  Thus, it is through the 
principle of reasonableness that fiduciary duties are extended to 
the public administration of laws.  Through this extension, one 
can see the administrative law colorings which underlie the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. 
C. Origins in Corporate Law 
Professor Geoffrey P. Miller offers insight into the corporate 
law background of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  He 
analogizes the Constitution to a corporate charter, as it sets forth 
 
30 THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton). 
31 See Natelson, supra note 5, at 97. 
32 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 23, at 135 (“If the principle of 
reasonableness derives solely from the existence of delegated discretionary power, 
then it would follow that the constitutionally delegated authority of Congress . . . is 
subject to the same requirements of reasonableness as is the constitutionally 
delegated authority of the president and the courts.”). 
33 See id. at 141–42. 
34 See id. at 142. 
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powers and limits, grants privileges and rights, delegates 
authority, and specifies its purpose—all functions of corporate 
charters in the founding era.35  Moreover, Miller observes that 
corporate charters from the colonial era were peppered with 
terms such as “necessary,” “proper,” and other similar scope 
provisions.36  This is a meaningful analysis in light of the 
draftsmen’s familiarity with corporate practice.37 
In his review of colonial era corporate charters, Miller found 
that clauses limiting managerial bodies’ discretion were 
pervasive.38  In these documents, governing entities are 
authorized to make laws “as they shall think fit,” “as shall be 
necessary,” and as “shall seem most convenient.”39  Limiting 
vocabulary attached to such exercises of power include terms like 
“proper,” “expedient,” “fit,” “convenient,” “advisable,” 
“reasonable,” and “conducive to.”40  There is an uncanny parallel 
between these terms’ use in corporate charters and in Necessary 
and Proper Clause interpretation, in that the language pattern 
always requires a fit between the ends recognized and the means 
employed.41 
This background proves useful when interpreting the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  For example, Professor Miller 
hypothesizes that just as scope clauses in corporate charters 
convey no independent authority, neither does the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.42  Rather, scope clauses in both contexts serve 
only to modify delegated authority.43  For example, corporate 
charters favored the term “necessary” over other limiting scope 
terms in contexts restricting lawmaking or rulemaking power.44  
Miller suggests that the reason for this was to protect against 
 
35 See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, in ORIGINS, supra note 3, at 144, 146–47. 
36 Id. at 145. 
37 See supra text accompanying note 11. See also Miller, supra note 35, at 149 
(“Given all this expertise, it would not be surprising if these men, when drafting the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, had employed concepts that were also current in 
corporate law practice of the time.”). 
38 Miller, supra note 35, at 150. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 152–53. 
41 See id. at 145. 
42 Id. at 155. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 167–68. Miller found that the term “necessary” appeared most 
frequently in the context of employment and rulemaking—two functions that can be 
considered “fundamental to achieving the goals of the enterprise.” Id. at 167. 
148 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:141   
broad grants of authority to corporate legislative bodies that 
might otherwise contravene state or federal law.45 
Miller’s suggestion fits well with the means-ends 
construction: “[t]he term ‘necessary,’ when used as a limitation 
on legislative authority in corporate charters, thus apparently 
required that rules enacted for the governance of the institution 
be reasonably closely adapted to achieving the goals for which 
the institution was formed.”46  In the same vein, the term 
“proper” serves a modifying function in corporate charters.  
Miller found that the term “proper” appears most frequently in 
contexts where shareholders’ interests are at stake.47  Therefore, 
it makes sense that the term “proper” requires power to be 
exercised with its effects on corporate stakeholders in mind.48  
The parallel for the Necessary and Proper Clause is that 
Congress must consider the effect of its laws on individual 
citizens irrespective of whether the law is “necessary.”49 
With these principles in mind, there is a compelling case for 
the influence of corporate charters upon the Constitution.  
Ultimately, such insight into the Necessary and Proper Clause 
suggests that there is a limited scope to its power, and that 
Congress’s delegated authority ought not to be exceeded.50 
D. Origins in the Doctrine of Implied Powers 
Professor John Mikhail, alternatively, takes a different 
approach to the scope and meaning of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause than Professors Lawson, Miller, Natelson, and Seidman.  
Mikhail emphasizes that the Clause is composed of three distinct 
provisions: 
1. “Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers” 
2. “Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
United States” 
 
45 Id. at 170. 
46 Id. at 170–71. In this context the “means” refer to laws enacted in furtherance 
of an enumerated power—the “end.” See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
47 For example, decisions to declare dividends, call meetings, levy a tax, set 
salaries, etc. See Miller, supra note 35, at 173–74. 
48 See id. 
49 Id. at 174. 
50 Id. 
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3. “Congress shall have Power...To make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in . . . any Department or 
Officer [of the United States].”51 
Of these three provisions, Mikhail contends that the second, or 
the “all other powers” provision, is the most important one for 
interpreting the Clause, yet scholars have largely ignored it.52  
According to Mikhail, the “all other powers” provision is more 
than just ancillary to Congress’s enumerated powers (its 
“foregoing” powers); rather, it refers to implied or un-enumerated 
powers embedded within the Constitution.53  Thus, “all other 
powers” means more than just the incidental authority to carry 
into effect Congress’s enumerated powers.  Under this 
interpretation, the “sweeping clause” encapsulates a broad scope 
of implied powers designed to give the government a vast 
measure of flexibility.54 
Mikhail draws support for this proposition from the fact that 
many of the Clause’s drafters were strong advocates for implied 
powers,55 especially after experiencing the crippling weakness of 
the Articles of Confederation.56  James Wilson in particular (the 
Clause’s primary draftsman) was an outspoken advocate of 
implied powers, and he had often sought to bolster congressional 
power with this doctrine.57  For support, Mikhail looks to the 
fervent pre-ratification debate between the Federalists and 
 
51 Mikhail, supra note 4, at 1046–47 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18). 
52 Id. at 1047. 
53 Id. Mikhail proposes that “[t]he existence of implied or unenumerated powers 
is thus explicitly recognized by the precise text of the Constitution, much like the 
existence of unenumerated rights.” Id. Note the tension of this view with Professor 
Miller’s contention that “[t]he corporate law background suggests that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause does not grant independent lawmaking competence[,] does not 
grant general legislative power, and does not delegate unilateral discretion to 
Congress to define whether a given action is or is not constitutionally authorized.” 
Miller, supra note 35, at 175. 
54 See Mikhail, supra note 4, at 1123. But see Barnett, supra note 2, at 192 (“The 
only powers that are necessary and proper for the national government are those 
that were enumerated; the only proper unenumerated powers are those derived from 
the nature of a power that was expressed.”) (emphasis in original). 
55 See Mikhail, supra note 4, at 1047 (“The second Necessary and Proper Clause 
was intended . . . to declare and to incorporate into the Constitution the doctrines of 
implied and inherent powers that [James] Wilson, Robert Morris, Gouverneur 
Morris, Alexander Hamilton, and other prominent nationalists at the constitutional 
convention had advocated throughout the previous decade . . . .”). 
56 See id. at 1088. 
57 See id. at 1061. 
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Anti-Federalists.  Whereas the Federalists argued that the 
Clause was superfluous—a toothless provision that would have 
applied to Congress even without its inclusion58—the 
Anti-Federalists berated the clause as one granting Congress 
“immense,” “unbounded” power.59  Given the robust debate 
generated by the “all other powers” provision, one can infer that 
the drafters understood the opaque and potentially dangerous 
nature of this provision. 
Significantly, Mikhail acknowledges and expands upon 
Miller’s corporate law thesis.  Mikhail probes James Wilson’s 
background as a corporate lawyer and its potential influence on 
his role in drafting the Necessary and Proper Clause.  For 
example, Wilson was a major shareholder and president of the 
Illinois-Wabash Company, “a principal shareholder of the 
Canaan Company,” and was immersed in both companies’ 
business and legal affairs.60  In addition, he was principally 
involved in several other business affairs in a legal capacity.61  
Furthermore, Mikhail offers examples of correspondence between 
Wilson and his business associates that are laden with 
concurrent uses of the terms “necessary” and “proper.”62  
Ultimately, “[a]ll of these examples demonstrate that Wilson was 
intimately acquainted with the phrase ‘necessary and proper’ and 
similar language before he incorporated this phrase into the 
Constitution while serving on the Committee of Detail.”63  
Indeed, a corporate understanding of the Clause feels 
compelling.64 
 
58 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. See also Barnett, supra note 2, at 
187 (“[A]ny ambiguity in the wording was clarified by the Federalists’ public 
insistence during the ratification that the Clause only authorized the enactment of 
laws that were incidental to the enumerated powers, and that this power would have 
been inherent to the enumerated powers had there been no Necessary and Proper 
Clause at the end of the list.”). 
59 See Mikhail, supra note 4, at 1059–60 (emphasis omitted) (quoting An Old 
Whig, No. 2 (Fall 1787), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 239, 239 (Philip B. 
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)). 
60 See id. at 1110–11. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. at 1112–13. 
63 Id. at 1114. 
64 However, this inference should be made carefully. Mikhail also notes that the 
corporate inquiry is “merely the tip of the iceberg.” Id. He proceeds to argue that the 
phrase “necessary and proper” was commonplace and comprehensible to most 
common English speakers of this era, and also warns against the inference that the 
phrase is a highly technical concept derived strictly from corporate law. See id. at 
1115. 
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In the end, only the Constitution’s draftsmen can truly know 
the intended scope, meaning, and function of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  However, inquiries into the fiduciary, 
administrative, and corporate law influences behind the clause 
shed light on its meaning.  So, too, does a keen look at the 
structure of the Clause itself and its key draftsman’s background.  
Certainly, with so much to consider, it is no surprise that the 
Supreme Court has struggled to espouse a truly pellucid 
interpretation of the Clause.  In the parts that follow, this Note 
will examine the Supreme Court’s conflicting Necessary and 
Proper Clause jurisprudence and categorize its dominant 
interpretations. 
II. EARLY SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
The Supreme Court first addressed the Necessary and 
Proper Clause in United States v. Fisher.65  There, the Court 
upheld a bankruptcy law which gave the United States priority 
over other creditors when debtors became insolvent.66  The case 
gave Chief Justice John Marshall his first opportunity to 
interpret the kinds of laws that the Clause covers. 
Almost immediately, Marshall relaxed the meaning of the 
word “necessary”: “[I]t would be incorrect . . . if the opinion 
should be maintained that no law was authorized which was not 
indispensably necessary to give effect to a specified power.”67  
Marshall’s language is inharmonious with Madison’s conception 
of the necessary and proper power in Federalist 44.  There, 
Madison imagined the quandary Congress would face without 
the Clause, when “exercising power indispensably necessary and 
proper, but, at the same time, not EXPRESSLY granted.”68  
Marshall, on the other hand, employed far less stringent 
language: “Congress must possess the choice of means, and must 
be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to 
the exercise of a power granted by the [C]onstitution.”69  Here, 
the granted power was that of Congress to pay the debts of the 
Union, and the Court found the bankruptcy act in question to be 
a proper means of effectuating that power.70  In the end, 
 
65 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805). 
66 Id. at 384. 
67 Id. at 396. 
68 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison) (first emphasis added). 
69 Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 396. 
70 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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Marshall left the door ajar for a far more in-depth discussion of 
the Clause. 
This discussion arrived in McCulloch v. Maryland, the 
seminal case for Necessary and Proper Clause interpretation.71  
There, Chief Justice Marshall upheld the creation of the Bank of 
the United States as a necessary and proper exercise of 
Congress’s power to borrow money.72  In doing so, he elucidated 
the Clause’s scope and its implications for congressional power.  
Marshall explicitly noted that the power to establish a bank or 
create a corporation is not enumerated anywhere in the 
Constitution.73  He also observed that the power to punish and 
the power to carry the mail are likewise not enumerated—rather, 
they are both conducive to the exercise of granted powers.74  
These examples illustrate his conviction that “necessary” does 
not mean “indispensably necessary.”75  To read such unbending 
limits into the Clause would render it toothless and leave 
Congress with inadequate means to execute its enumerated 
powers.76  Instead, Marshall averred that “necessary” simply 
means “convenient, or useful, or essential to another 
[enumerated power].”77  He found structural support for this 
reading in Article I, § 10 of the Constitution, which prohibits 
states “from laying ‘imposts, or duties on imports or exports, 
except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its 
inspection laws.’ ”78  The disparity between “necessary” and 
“absolutely necessary” indicates that the draftsmen knew how to 
create a rigid necessity standard and consciously refrained from 
doing so with the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
 
71 McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See also Gary 
Lawson & Neil S. Siegel, Interpretation: Necessary and Proper Clause, NAT’L. CONST. 
CTR. (last visited May 18, 2019), https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
constitution/interpretations/necessary-and-proper-clause. 
72 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 424. 
73 Id. at 406. 
74 Id. at 416–17. 
75 This is the same argument espoused in Fisher. See supra notes 66–67 and 
accompanying text. 
76 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415. Marshall emphasized the importance of 
a relaxed reading: “This provision is made in a constitution, intended to endure for 
ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human 
affairs.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
77 Id. at 413. 
78 Id. at 414 (emphasis in original). Marshall also notes that structurally the 
clause is included in § 8, which describes the powers of Congress—not its limits. Id. 
at 419–20. 
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Although Marshall devoted much effort to probing the bank’s 
necessity, he spent little time addressing its propriety.  Just 
because a law is “necessary”—incident to carrying into effect an 
enumerated power—it does not automatically follow that the law 
is “proper.”  Despite the lack of discussion, this is a key takeaway 
from what is perhaps the most perennial language in the opinion:  
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist 
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”79  
The language here, namely “within the scope of the constitution,” 
“appropriate,” “plainly adapted,” and “not prohibited,” speak 
toward propriety. 
Perhaps it becomes useful here to apply Professor Miller’s 
corporate interpretation of “proper.”  According to Miller, laws 
must not “discriminate against or otherwise disproportionately 
affect the interests of individual citizens.”80  Alternatively, 
perhaps “proper” means “within Congress’s domain or 
jurisdiction,” so as to not usurp the rights of states and 
individuals, as Professors Lawson and Granger suggest.81  Either 
way, Marshall’s “consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution” language indicates that, if nothing else, “proper” 
laws must not otherwise be in violation of the Constitution.82 
After McCulloch, we are left with a muddied approach to 
Necessary and Proper Clause interpretation.  The takeaway is 
that “necessary” and “proper” laws are those which are 
convenient or useful to executing one or more of Congress’s 
enumerated powers and do not otherwise violate the 
Constitution.  This is a nebulous inquiry that can easily be 
stretched for the sake of argument.  However, it is an inquiry 
that has stood the test of time and continues to be interpreted to 
this day.  The next part of this Note examines how the Supreme 
Court has both compressed and elasticized the Necessary and 
Proper Clause after McCulloch. 
 
79 Id. at 421. 
80 See Miller, supra note 35, at 175. 
81 See Lawson & Granger, supra note 3, at 271 (emphasis omitted). 
82 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. Marshall addressed the holding in 
McCulloch five years later in Osborn v. Bank of the United States. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
738, 860 (1824) (“The whole opinion of the Court, in the case of M’Culloch v. The 
State of Maryland, is founded on, and sustained by, the idea that the Bank is an 
instrument which is ‘necessary and proper for carrying into effect the powers vested 
in the government of the United States.’”). 
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III. CONFLICTING CATEGORIES OF INTERPRETATION 
The Supreme Court’s Necessary and Proper Clause 
jurisprudence has been mercurial throughout the years.  With 
several conflicting interpretations, there is no clear answer to the 
question of the Sweeping Clause’s scope.  Instead, the Supreme 
Court has erratically given broad interpretations, narrow 
interpretations, and many in between.  This Part divides the 
Supreme Court’s necessary and proper jurisprudence into four 
different categories.  Within the broad sphere lie the “Rational 
Connection” approach and the “Chain-link” approach.  
Conversely, the “One-step” approach and the “Federalist 
Restriction” are in the narrow sphere. 
A. Broad Interpretations 
Proponents of a broad interpretation of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause generally argue that it encompasses a vast 
amalgam of implied governmental powers that Congress may use 
to legislate for the Nation’s general welfare.83  One possible hook 
for this view is Madison’s language in Federalist 44:  “No axiom 
is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that 
wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; 
wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular 
power necessary for doing it is included.”84  This language lends 
itself to a broad interpretation”—every particular power 
necessary” casts a broad net.  Additionally, there are textual 
hooks in McCulloch that bespeak a broad construction of the 
Clause.  In particular, recall Chief Justice Marshall’s definition 
of “necessary” as merely convenient or useful.85  As discussed 
herein, this definition is crucial in cases that take an expansive 
view of the Clause. 
1. The “Rational Connection” Approach 
In Jinks v. Richland County, South Carolina, the Supreme 
Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) was necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution Congress’s power “ ‘[t]o constitute 
Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court,’ and to assure that 
 
83 See supra Part I.D. 
84 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison). Although the language itself might 
imply a broad construction, it is important to remember that Federalist 44 was 
written to assuage the fears of the Anti-Federalists that the Clause would give 
Congress too much power. 
85 See supra note 77, and accompanying text. 
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those tribunals may fairly and efficiently exercise ‘[t]he judicial 
Power of the United States.’ ”86  There, the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), which requires the 
tolling of state statutes of limitations while cases are pending in 
federal court, was unconstitutional when applied to lawsuits 
against a State’s political subdivisions.87  The Supreme Court 
disagreed and upheld the law as a valid exercise of the Sweeping 
Clause power.88 
To uphold the law, the Court applied a two-prong analysis as 
to necessity and propriety.  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, 
cited to McCulloch for its lax definition of necessity, and he 
declared that “§1367(d) is ‘conducive to the due administration of 
justice’ in federal court, and is ‘plainly adapted’ to that end.”89  
Although not absolutely necessary, § 1367(d) provided an 
efficient alternative to the mediocre options previously available 
to federal judges in deciding whether to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over claims that would otherwise be time barred in 
state court.90  Here, this was enough to satisfy the McCulloch 
definition of “necessary.”  In accordance with McCulloch, the 
Court described the law as “conducive to the due administration 
of justice.”91  Furthermore, as to propriety, Scalia opined that 
§ 1367(d) was “plainly adapted” to Congress’s enumerated power 
to constitute inferior courts, as “the connection between § 1367(d) 
and Congress’s authority over the federal courts [is not] so 
attenuated as to undermine the enumeration of powers set forth 
in Article I, § 8.”92 
The takeaway from Jinks is that a law that is an efficient 
alternative to its predecessor is both “necessary” and “proper” so 
long as its connection to an enumerated power is “not so 
attenuated.”  Congress is given significant latitude under this 
 
86 Jinks v. Richland Cty., S.C., 538 U.S. 456, 462 (2003) (citations omitted) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1). The power “to 
constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court” is vested in Article I, § 8, clause 
9 of the Constitution, and the “judicial Power of the United States” is vested in the 
Supreme Court in Article II, § 1. 
87 Id. at 458. 
88 Id. at 465. 
89 Id. at 462. 
90 Id. at 462–463. 
91 Id. at 462 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 417 
(1819)); see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 418 (describing the power of 
punishment as “a right incidental to the power, and conducive to its beneficial 
exercise”). 
92 Jinks, 538 U.S. at 464 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421). 
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standard.  However, nowhere does the Court mention anything 
about implied powers.  In this case, Congress is operating 
pursuant to an enumerated power.  In fact, the Court omits 
language addressing Congress’s “foregoing powers” or “all other 
powers” and instead inserts “Congress’s Article I, § 8” power 
squarely into its recital of the Clause.93  Thus, although ceding 
substantial discretion to Congress to carry out its ends, the Court 
makes clear that it is dealing with enumerated—not  
implied—power.  Such is the nature of the rational connection 
approach; Congress is given leeway in employing its means, so 
long as there is a rational connection to an enumerated end. 
The rational connection approach is also present in Gonzalez 
v. Raich.  There, the Supreme Court applied a deferential 
rationality analysis allowing Congress to reach purely local 
activity as a necessary and proper means of executing its 
commerce power.94  A concurring Justice Scalia declared that “the 
nature of the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . empowers 
Congress to enact laws in effectuation of its enumerated powers 
that are not within its authority to enact in isolation.”95  
Additionally, Scalia expounded that congressional means must 
be “appropriate” and “plainly adapted” to their enumerated 
ends.96 
The logical underpinnings in Gonzalez are similar to those in 
Jinks.  Just as the standard for necessity was lax there, it 
remains so in Gonzalez.  Scalia describes necessary laws as laws 
without which the effective exercise of an enumerated power 
would be undercut.97  In other words, laws are probative of 
necessity if geared toward an activity that impedes the exercise 
of a granted power.98  In both cases, the Court adhered to 
McCulloch’s broad standard of necessity.  Additionally, the 
standard for propriety in Jinks is repeated in Scalia’s concurring 
opinion in Gonzalez.  The majority opinion in Jinks and Scalia’s 
 
93 Id. at 461. 
94 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (holding that the Controlled 
Substances Act was a necessary and proper exercise of Congress’s commerce power). 
95 Id. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 36. Here, the standard applies in the context of interstate commerce. 
Scalia looks to the Court’s ruling in United States v. Lopez, where it recognized that 
non-economic activity “could be regulated as ‘an essential part of a larger regulation 
of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the 
intrastate activity were regulated.’” Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
561 (1995)). 
98 Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
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concurrence in Gonzalez both define proper laws as “appropriate” 
and “plainly adapted” to carrying out an enumerated power.99  
Again, the inquiry calls for a rational connection between 
appropriate means and legitimate ends. 
Furthermore, the Court endorsed a strong application of the 
rational connection approach in Sabri v. United States.  There, 
the Court upheld an Act of Congress proscribing bribery of state 
and local officials who were involved in entities that receive 
federal funds.100  Justice Souter, writing for the majority, 
described the law as a necessary and proper exercise of 
Congress’s Spending Clause power to appropriate federal money 
to promote the general welfare.101  In determining the law’s 
necessity, the Court relied on efficient alternative reasoning, 
similar to that in Jinks.102  Souter opined that prior federal 
bribery laws were inadequate for protecting federal interests, 
and therefore Congress was acting within the scope of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.103  For support, the Court 
portrayed McCulloch as establishing a “means-ends rationality” 
for Necessary and Proper Clause inquiries.104  Moreover, the 
Court claimed that to invalidate the law under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, the petitioner would have to prove that it 
“‘ha[d] nothing to do with’ the congressional spending power.”105  
This implies that only some nexus is required between the law 
and an enumerated power—some rational connection to it.  Only 
without a rational connection can legislation fail under this 
inquiry. 
Ultimately, the rational connection approach falls on the 
broad side of Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence.  It 
certainly gives Congress considerable discretion and flexibility in 
passing laws that are “necessary.”  To pass muster, laws must 
generally be made in furtherance of an enumerated power by 
either replacing prior ineffective laws as in Jinks and Sabri or 
executing a larger regulatory scheme to prevent interference 
with enumerated powers as in Gonzalez.  As for “proper” laws, 
they must merely be “plainly adapted” or “appropriate” to their 
 
99 Id. at 37, 39; Jinks v. Richland Cty., S.C., 538 U.S. 456, 462, 464 (2003). 
100 United States v. Sabri, 541 U.S. 600, 602 (2004). 
101 Id. at 605. 
102 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
103 See Sabri, 541 U.S. at 606–7. 
104 Id. at 605. 
105 Id. at 608 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561). 
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ends.  All in all, the rational connection approach instills a 
valuable measure of flexibility in Congress to “prescrib[e] the 
means by which government should, in all future time, execute 
its powers.”106  On the flip side, it potentially turns the 
“necessary” inquiry into an accordion concept to be stretched over 
any measure of legislation.  However, it is certainly not the 
broadest method of Necessary and Proper Clause interpretation 
put forth by the Supreme Court. 
2. The “Chain-link” Approach 
In United States v. Comstock, the Supreme Court upheld a 
federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 4248) that allowed civil commitment 
of sexually dangerous federal prisoners beyond the date the 
prisoner would otherwise be released.107  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Breyer laid out an extensive five-step test to 
place § 4248 within the scope of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  First, Breyer recounted the breadth with which the 
Clause permits Congress to legislate.108  Specifically, Breyer cited 
Chief Justice Marshall’s standard from McCulloch—that 
Congress may enact laws which are “convenient, or useful.”109  He 
determined that whether a law is necessary is ultimately within 
Congress’s purview.110  Second, Breyer cited to a long history of 
federal involvement in this area.111  He recited several examples 
of the federal government giving mental health care to civilly 
committed federal prisoners.112  Third, Breyer contended that 
Congress had sound reasons for enacting § 4248 in light of its 
“role as federal custodian.”113  Here, the inference comes not from 
 
106 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). 
107 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 130 (2010). 
108 Id. at 133. 
109 Id. at 133–34 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 408). 
110 Id. at 135 (“[T]he means adopted and the end to be attained, are matters for 
congressional determination alone.” (quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 
534, 547–48 (1934))). Additionally, Breyer sidesteps an inquiry into § 4248’s 
propriety by declaring that “the present statute’s validity under provisions of the 
Constitution other than the Necessary and Proper Clause is an issue that is not 
before us.” Id. Instead, the Court assumes—but does not decide—that other 
Constitutional provisions, such as Due Process, would not prohibit the statute. Id. at 
133. 
111 Comstock, 560 U.S. at 137. However, Breyer does note that “even a 
longstanding history of related federal action does not demonstrate a statute’s 
constitutionality.” Id. 
112 Comstock, 560 U.S. at 137–140. 
113 Id. at 142. Significantly, Congress’s “role as federal custodian” is mentioned 
nowhere in the Constitution. 
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the Constitution, but from the Restatement (2d) of Torts § 319, 
which states that “one ‘who takes charge of a third person’ is 
‘under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control’ that 
person . . . .”114  Thus, § 4248 does not carry into effect a specific 
enumerated power, but rather Congress’s common-law-derived 
“role as federal custodian.”  Fourth, Breyer argued that § 4248 
accommodates state interests.  The law requires the Attorney 
General to encourage states to take custody of federal prisoners 
encompassed by the Act, and also requires the federal 
government to relinquish its authority when a State asserts its 
own.115  Finally, Breyer noted that the law is narrow in scope—it 
affects only a small amount of federal prisoners who are already 
in federal custody.116  Therefore, it does not confer a general 
police power on the federal government.117  Ultimately, amidst 
these five considerations, the Court concluded that § 4248 is “a 
‘necessary and proper’ means of exercising the federal authority 
that permits Congress to create federal criminal laws, to punish 
their violation, to imprison violators, [and] to provide 
appropriately for those imprisoned.”118 
Breyer’s inquiry in Comstock is a far departure from the 
two-part tests discussed above to determine whether laws are 
“necessary” and “proper.”  The concept of a “chain-link” is 
invoked here because Breyer, ironically, must “‘pile inference 
upon inference’ in order to sustain congressional action under 
Article I.”119  For example, without attaching § 4248 to an 
enumerated power, the Court made several inferences to come up 
with the “federal custodian power.”  After quoting the 
Restatement (2d) of Torts for a Congressional duty to prevent 
people in federal custody from harming others,120  Breyer 
postulated:  
If a federal prisoner is infected with a communicable disease 
that threatens others, surely it would be ‘necessary and proper’ 
for the Federal Government to take action, pursuant to its role 
as federal custodian, to refuse . . . to release that individual 
 
114 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (AM. LAW INST.  
1963–64)). 
115 Id. at 144–45. 
116 Id. at 148. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 149. Note that none of these powers are expressly enumerated in the 
Constitution. 
119 Id. at 146 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567). 
120 Id. at 142. 
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among the general public, where he might infect others. . . . And 
if confinement of such an individual is a ‘necessary and proper’ 
thing to do, then how could it not be similarly ‘necessary and 
proper’ to confine an individual whose mental illness threatens 
others to the same degree?121 
Note the string of inferences here.  The Court goes from the 
tort law duty of reasonable care, to the federal government 
hypothetically containing quarantined federal prisoners, to 
containing mentally ill prisoners who could hypothetically inflict 
similar harm, to a federal custodial power.122  Rather than an 
execution of enumerated power, we have a series of  
inferences—hence the term “Chain-link.”  At no point throughout 
the inquiry does the Court mention which enumerated power 
§ 4248 carries into effect.  In vague terms, Breyer claims it to be 
“the same enumerated power that justifies the creation of a 
federal criminal statute,”123 without specifying exactly which 
enumerated power that is.  Ultimately, this is a very elasticized 
approach.  The Sweeping Clause power is stretched from those 
laws, which are “convenient” and “useful” to the beneficial 
exercise of enumerated power and not otherwise in violation of 
the Constitution,124 to a five-factor balancing test. 
This approach recurs in United States v. Kebodeaux.  There, 
the Court upheld the “Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act” (SORNA) as applied to an ex-military member under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.125  SORNA requires federal sex 
offenders to register in the state where they reside and applies to 
offenders who have already completed their sentences at the time 
the law was passed.126  Respondent, Anthony Kebodeaux, was in 
the Air Force when he was convicted under the United States 
Code of Military Justice for having sex with a minor; 
subsequently, he received three months’ imprisonment and was 
discharged from the Air Force.127  By the time SORNA was 
enacted, he had already completed his sentence.128  When 
 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 148. 
124 See supra Part II (discussing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 
(1819)). 
125 United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 389 (2013). Justice Breyer wrote 
the majority opinion in this case as well. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 408 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
128 Id. 
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Kebodeaux moved from El Paso, Texas to San Antonio without 
updating his registration, he was sentenced to a year and a day 
in prison.129 
In this case the Supreme Court had at its disposal two 
enumerated powers it could have potentially used to uphold 
SORNA as applied to Kebodeaux under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause: the Spending power and the Military Regulation 
power. The Court referenced a similar federal act—the 
“Wetterling Act”—and implied that it was a valid exercise of 
Congress’s Spending power.130  Although SORNA does feel far 
removed from Congress’s power to spend for the general welfare, 
the Government did offer this argument to the Court.131  
However, the Court glossed over this argument and did not apply 
it in its Necessary and Proper Clause inquiry.  Second, there was 
an argument that SORNA could apply to Kebodeaux by virtue of 
Congress’s enumerated power to regulate the armed forces, since 
Kebodeaux was an Airman at the time of his offense.132  Indeed, 
the Court recognized this,133 but did not limit its analysis to the 
combination of Military Regulation power and Necessary and 
Proper Clause power. 
Instead, the Court employed the five-factor “Chain-link” 
approach used in Comstock.  As in Comstock, the Court kicked off 
by assuming without deciding that SORNA does not violate the 
 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 391 (majority opinion) (“Like SORNA, [the Wetterling Act] used the 
federal spending power to encourage States to adopt sex offender registration 
laws.”). 
131 Id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas does not find the 
Spending Power argument compelling. He contends that SORNA “does not execute 
Congress’ spending power because it regulates individuals who have not necessarily 
received federal funds of any kind.” Id. at 411. 
132 See id. at 399 (majority opinion). Concurring in the judgment, Chief Justice 
Roberts advocates this approach, and he suggests that “Congress had the power, 
under the Military Regulation and Necessary and Proper Clauses of Article I, to 
require Anthony Kebodeaux to register as a sex offender. The majority, having 
established that premise and thus resolved the case before us, nevertheless goes on 
to discuss the general public safety benefits of the registration requirement.” Id. 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring). But see id. at 412 (Thomas, J., dissenting). “Kebodeaux 
had long since fully served his criminal sentence for violating Article 120(b) of the 
UCMJ and was no longer in the military when Congress enacted SORNA. Congress 
does not retain a general police power over every person who has ever served in the 
military.” Id. Furthermore, it is important to note that the Military Regulation 
power is only in the conversation here because of Kebodeaux’s military service. 
SORNA itself applies to civilians as well, thus it cannot be upheld in its entirety 
under this theory. 
133 Id. at 395 (majority opinion). 
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Ex Post Facto or Due Process Clauses,134 thereby circumventing 
any analysis under the McCulloch requirement that necessary 
and proper laws must not otherwise be in violation of the 
Constitution.135  The Court then proceeded with the Comstock 
analysis.  First, it noted the breadth of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, and it resolved that “Congress could reasonably conclude 
that registration requirements applied to federal sex offenders 
after their release can help protect the public from those federal 
sex offenders and alleviate public safety concerns.”136  Second, the 
Court observed that the Federal Government has a long history 
of tracking federal prisoners to protect the public.137  Third, the 
Court noted the government’s sound reasons for requiring 
registration—to protect the public from sex-offender 
recidivism.138  Fourth, the law accommodates state interests 
because it only encourages States to adopt its definitions and 
requirements, rather than mandating them to do so.139  Finally, 
the Court contended that the law’s application is reasonably 
narrow because Kebodeaux was “already subject to federal 
registration requirements that were themselves a valid exercise 
of federal power under the Military Regulation and Necessary 
and Proper Clauses.”140 
As in Comstock, the Court relied upon a chain of inferential 
reasoning.  Here, the chain begins with Congress’s enumerated 
power to regulate the armed forces.141  Through that power, 
Kebodeaux was subject to federal registration requirements 
under the Wetterling Act.142  Then, because Kebodeaux was 
already subject to these requirements, Congress could rightly use 
the Necessary and Proper Clause—under the five-factor 
 
134 Id. at 389. 
135 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
136 Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. at 395. This is a source of discord for Justices Roberts 
and Thomas, who both fear that “public safety concerns” could amount to a federal 
police power. See id. at 401–02 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 412–13 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
137 Id. at 396–97 (majority opinion). 
138 Id. This reasoning sounds somewhat like a recurrence of the “federal 
custodian” role that the Court imagined in Comstock. 
139 Id. at 398. 
140 Id. at 397. 
141 Id. at 394. 
142 Id. at 391. The Wetterling Act imposed federal penalties upon federal sex 
offenders who did not register at the state level. Id. The Court argues that under 
this Act, the Attorney General delegated his power to designate sex offenses to the 
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, who in turn designated the offense Kebodeaux 
was charged with under the Code of Military Justice. Id. at 391–92. 
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Comstock inquiry—to apply the modified yet similar registration 
requirements of SORNA to him.143  Ultimately, this leaves us two 
steps and five factors away from an enumerated power, which 
was applied dubiously to begin with.144  The takeaway is this: 
applying SORNA to Kebodeaux was not a necessary and proper 
exercise of an enumerated congressional power; rather, it was a 
“ ‘necessary and proper’ means for furthering [Congress’s] 
pre-existing registration ends.”145 
Notice what the “Chain-link” approach enables Congress to 
do.  In both Comstock and Kebodeaux, Congress was not 
legislating in a manner “incidental to those powers which are 
expressly given.”146  Rather, it appears that Congress was acting 
in furtherance of “other laws [it] has enacted in the exercise of its 
incidental authority.”147  This gives Congress great discretion 
under the Sweeping Clause.  Ultimately, although this approach 
does allow for flexibility in legislation, it is hard to imagine a law 
that cannot be masqueraded as “carrying into Execution”148 some 
other law which is in turn incidental to enumerated authority. 
B. Narrow Interpretations 
Proponents of a narrow reading of the Clause find support in 
the Federalists’ pre-ratification arguments.  The Federalists 
defended the Clause as superfluous.149  They contended that 
legislation under this Clause could only serve expressly 
enumerated powers.150  In fact, they averred that the Clause had 
to be expressly tied to a vested power and that Congress drew no 
substantive power from the Clause not already inherent in its 
other enumerated powers.151  Alexander Hamilton, for instance, 
viewed the Clause as “declaratory of a truth which would have 
resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication from the very 
act of constituting a federal government, and vesting it with 
certain specified powers.”152  He assuaged the Anti-federalists’ 
 
143 Id. at 393–94. 
144 See id. at 412 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
145 Id. at 399 (majority opinion). 
146 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819). 
147 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 168 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis in original). 
148 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 18. 
149 See Natelson, supra note 5, at 106. 
150 Id. at 97. 
151 Id. at 116. 
152 THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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fears that the Clause would allow Congress to usurp state power 
by proclaiming that “[t]he declaration itself, though it may be 
chargeable with tautology or redundancy, is at least perfectly 
harmless.”153  As discussed below, narrow readings pin the 
Clause very closely to enumerated power. 
1. The “One-step” Approach 
The “One-step” approach is exactly what it sounds like.  
Rather than leaning on a broad doctrine of implied powers or 
employing a five-factor inquiry, this approach mandates that 
statutes enacted under the Necessary and Proper Clause must 
explicitly be in furtherance of one or more of Congress’s 
enumerated powers.  This approach keeps the Clause far more 
compressed than any of the approaches examined thus far. 
Justice Thomas’s dissent in United States v. Comstock is 
perhaps the best articulation of this approach.  Thomas responds 
to the majority’s five-step approach by resorting to the core of 
Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence: he breaks 
McCulloch down into a two-part test.  First, the law must be 
directed toward an enumerated end; second, there must be a 
“necessary and proper fit” between the law and the enumerated 
power.154  Critically, this test establishes a bright-line rule: “no 
matter how ‘necessary’ or ‘proper’ an Act of Congress may be to 
its objective, Congress lacks authority to legislate if the objective 
is anything other than ‘carrying into Execution’ one or more of 
the Federal Government’s enumerated powers.”155 
Under this inquiry, § 4248 necessarily fails because it is not 
directed toward an enumerated power.  Despite the majority’s 
attempt to link it to “the same enumerated power”156 that gives 
Congress the power to punish,157 Thomas contends that Congress 
has the power to punish interference with an enumerated 
power.158  Holding inmates past their release dates does not 
address any such interference.  Furthermore, Thomas rebukes 
the majority’s notion that the “federal custodial” power derives 
from the Restatement of Torts.  He points out “[t]hat citation [to 
 
153 Id. 
154 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 160 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
155 Id. at 161 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 18). Subsequently, Thomas 
invokes the pre-ratification Federalist position that the Clause simply states what is 
already implicit. Id. 
156 Id. at 148 (majority opinion). 
157 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 416–17 (1819). 
158 Comstock, 560 U.S. at 169–70 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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the Restatement] is puzzling because federal authority derives 
from the Constitution, not the common law.”159  Without an 
enumerated power, § 4248 does not make it past the first step of 
this approach; therefore, any further inquiry is redundant. 
The “One-step” approach surfaces again in NFIB v. Sebelius.  
There, five justices declined to uphold the individual mandate of 
the Affordable Care Act as a necessary and proper exercise of 
Congress’s commerce power.  In part III(A)(2) of the opinion, 
Chief Justice Roberts (writing alone) adopts a restrictive view of 
the Clause, echoing Thomas’s dissent in Comstock.160  Roberts 
begins by omitting the “all other powers” language from his 
recital of the Clause, and inserting the term “enumerated” into 
the McCulloch definition.161  Note the consonance here with 
Thomas’s Comstock dissent—there must be an enumerated power 
for Congress to invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
Moreover, Roberts expressly lays out the “proper” prong of the 
McCulloch inquiry, which the Court bypassed in Comstock and 
later in Kebodeaux; that is, laws that are inconsistent with the 
Constitution are not proper, regardless of their necessity.162  This 
fits markedly well with Thomas’s two-part interpretation of the 
McCulloch standard: the law must fit with an enumerated end 
and remain “consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution.”163 
Under the weight of this inquiry, the individual mandate 
collapses.  Rather than providing an incidental exercise of 
enumerated power, the individual mandate “vests Congress with 
the extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the 
exercise of an enumerated power.”164  This is because Congress is 
not regulating economic activity here—they are regulating 
inactivity.165  To allow Congress this discretion would yield 
 
159 Id. at 173. 
160 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.’s v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 559 (2012).  
161 Id. at 560  (“The power to ‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution’ the powers enumerated in the Constitution, Art. 
I, § 8, cl. 18, vests Congress with authority to enact provisions ‘incidental to the 
[enumerated] power, and conducive to its beneficial exercise.’ ” (quoting McCulloch, 
17 (4 Wheat.) U.S. at 418 (alteration in original)). 
162 Id. 
163 Id. (alternation in original) (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421). 
164 Id.  
165 Id. By allowing Congress to reach this far,  
such a conception of the Necessary and Proper Clause would work a 
substantial expansion of federal authority. No longer would Congress be 
limited to regulating under the Commerce Clause those who by some 
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potentially unbounded regulatory authority under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause. 
Ultimately, the “One-step” approach is a straightforward, 
predictable, and easily applied test.  Put simply, the primary 
question is “pursuant to which power is Congress legislating?”  If 
the answer is not an enumerated power, then it is beyond the 
scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Certainly, this feels 
consistent with Alexander Hamilton’s position that the Clause 
simply articulates that which is already implied in the 
Constitution.166  Admittedly, it does not allow for as much 
legislative flexibility as a broad reading of the clause—but it does 
create well-defined boundaries and predictability. 
2. The “Federalist Restriction” 
The “Federalist Restriction” mandates a reading of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause that hinges largely upon the 
meaning of “proper” and the scope of the Tenth Amendment.  The 
crux of this approach is that despite a law’s necessity, it must not 
encroach upon state sovereignty.  Federal laws that abridge the 
sovereign immunity of the States are not “proper,” and therefore, 
are not constitutional applications of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. 
The Court sums up the Federalist Restriction succinctly in 
Printz v. United States.  There, the Court declined to uphold 
provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act as a 
necessary and proper exercise of Congress’s commerce power.167  
The Brady Act required state law enforcement officers to conduct 
background checks on prospective handgun purchasers, thereby 
forcing state officials to participate in a federal regulatory 
scheme.168  The dissent would have held that Congress’s power to 
regulate handguns stems from its commerce power, and in turn 
enlisting state law enforcement officers to carry out the Brady 
 
preexisting activity bring themselves within the sphere of federal 
regulation. Instead, Congress could reach beyond the natural limit of its 
authority and draw within its regulatory scope those who otherwise would 
be outside of it. 
Id. 
166 THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton). 
167 Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997). 
168 Id. at 898. The Court felt that doing so would upset the separation of powers, 
by transferring federal executive power to thousands of state law enforcement 
officers. Id. at 922. 
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Act was a necessary and proper execution of that power.169  The 
majority, however, refrains from applying “the last, best hope of 
those who defend ultra vires congressional action, the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.”170  Instead, the Court proclaims that laws, 
whether they are executing an enumerated power or not, are not 
proper if they violate constitutional principles of state 
sovereignty.171  The inference here is that a law’s propriety 
trumps its necessity.172  The Court finds support for this idea in 
the words of Alexander Hamilton: “[The Brady Act] is not a 
La[w] . . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce 
Clause, and is thus, in the words of the Federalist, merely [an] 
ac[t] of usurpation which deserve[s] to be treated as such.”173 
Two years later in Alden v. Maine, the Court affirmed this 
view.  There, the Court was asked to determine whether 
Congress could subject nonconsenting States to private suits in 
their own courts.174  The dispute arose when plaintiffs sued the 
State of Maine (their employer) for violations of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.175  After their action was dismissed in federal 
court, the plaintiffs brought the same action in state court.176  
The Court ultimately sustained dismissal of the suit as a 
violation of the States’ sovereign immunity, declining to 
“conclude that the specific Article I powers delegated to Congress 
necessarily include, by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
or otherwise, the incidental authority to subject the States to 
private suits as a means of achieving objectives otherwise within 
the scope of the enumerated powers.”177  The logic here is 
essentially the same as in Printz—regardless of a law’s necessity 
or the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers, it must not 
abridge principles of state sovereignty.  In fact, the Court cites 
 
169 Id. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
170 Id. at 923 (majority opinion). 
171 Id. at 923–24. 
172 Note the contrast between this approach and the “Chain-link” approach in 
Comstock and Kebodeaux. In those cases, the Court does not address whether the 
contested laws are “proper,” but instead focuses only on the laws’ necessity. Here, 
conversely, the Court does not address whether the Brady Act is “necessary,” but 
instead jumps immediately to whether the law is “proper.” 
173 Printz, 521 U.S. at 924 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 214 (Alexander Hamilton) (M. Walter Dunne ed., 1901)). 
174 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999). 
175 Id. at 711–12. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 732. 
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language from Printz to emphasize the propriety of laws in light 
of state sovereignty.178 
A third articulation of the “Federalist Restriction” can be 
found in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Comstock.  
Although Kennedy ultimately vindicates § 4248 as constitutional 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause,179 he also voices an 
insightful discussion of the Clause’s relationship to the Tenth 
Amendment.  Kennedy avers that if a congressional exercise of 
Sweeping Clause power is constitutional, then it is not a power 
reserved to the States, and the two are mutually exclusive.180  
This comports with the “proper” prong espoused in McCulloch—
precepts of federalism molded by the “the letter and spirit of the 
[C]onstitution,”181 indicate whether a law is in fact “proper.”182  
Just as in Printz and Alden, there is a strong emphasis here on 
the law’s propriety rather than its bare necessity.  There is an 
implication that “proper” federal laws cannot usurp the powers 
reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment: “It is of 
fundamental importance to consider whether essential attributes 
of state sovereignty are compromised by the assertion of federal 
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . .”183 
Ultimately, under this approach, inquiries into the 
Necessary and Proper Clause are guided by principles of 
federalism.  Interestingly, they focus almost entirely on the law’s 
propriety rather than its necessity.  This places an effective cap 
on the Clause while still retaining flexibility as to necessity.  
Thus, Congress retains broad discretion as to its means, but 
cannot elasticize the Clause so much that it impedes the States’ 
prerogative. 
IV. THE RATIONAL FEDERALIST APPROACH 
To this point, this Note has examined four different methods 
of interpreting the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Two broad: the 
“Rational Connection” and “Chain-link” approaches; and two 
narrow: the “One-step” and “Federalist Restriction” approaches.  
 
178 Id. at 732–33 (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24); see also supra note 173 
and accompanying text. 
179 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 150 (2010) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
180 Id. at 153. 
181 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
182 Id. 
183 Comstock, 560 U.S. at 153 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages, but no one 
alone embodies the full depth of the Clause.  As such, it is 
difficult to determine which is the true mantle of Necessary and 
Proper Clause jurisprudence. 
All things considered, the most accurate interpretation lies 
not in one singular approach, but in a blend of the “Rational 
Connection” and the “Federalist Restriction” approaches.  
Although the former falls on the broad side of the spectrum and 
the latter on the narrow, the two taken together provide a useful 
balance of flexibility and restraint that could prove useful in 
future interpretations of the Clause.  This Part will argue that 
the “Rational Connection” espouses the best interpretation of 
“necessary,” and that the “Federalist Restriction” best dictates 
which laws are “proper.”  It is crucial that both prongs of the 
inquiry be considered, despite the Court’s trend of locking in on 
one or the other.184  Ultimately, a synthesis of these two 
approaches creates the most efficient interpretation of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. 
A. Laws that are “Necessary” 
The Rational Connection approach, although broad, provides 
an effective mode of interpreting the “necessary” prong of the 
Sweeping Clause.  There are three important factors that make 
this approach effective: it is consistent with McCulloch, it 
embodies scholarly administrative and corporate law theories, 
and it gives Congress flexibility in executing its enumerated 
powers. 
First, the “Rational Connection” approach as to necessity 
hardly deviates from McCulloch.  Remember, Chief Justice 
Marshall broadly defines “necessary” as meaning not “absolutely 
necessary,” but simply “convenient” or “useful.”185  Indeed, he 
declares that necessary laws must be “appropriate” and “plainly 
 
184 Alternatively, Professor Bray proposes that the clause could be interpreted 
as a hendiadys—that is, a figure of speech in which two terms separated by a 
conjunction form one single expression. Samuel Bray, “Necessary and Proper” and 
“Cruel and Unusual”: Hendiadys in the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 688 
(2016). For example, one might describe a cow as “nice and fat,” meaning only one 
quality rather than that the cow is both “nice” and “fat.” Id. at 689. In the same vein, 
interpreting the Necessary and Proper Clause as a hendiadys would eliminate 
separate inquiries into necessity and propriety, and instead yield one inquiry into 
the connection between congressional action and an enumerated power. Id. at 737–
38. 
185 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413. 
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adapted.”186  It is this very same language that permeates the 
Rational Connection approach.  In both Jinks and Gonzalez, the 
Court upholds the necessity of congressional action as “conducive 
to the due administration of justice,” “plainly adapted,” and 
“appropriate.”187  Essentially, this is the standard McCulloch 
contemplates.188  Without adequate discretion to carry out the 
powers conferred to it by the Constitution, Congress would be 
unable “to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to 
accommodate its legislation to circumstances.”189  By rejecting a 
rigid standard of necessity and allowing Congressional 
discretion, the Rational Connection upholds the mantle of 
McCulloch—as to necessity, at least. 
Additionally, the discretion allowed in determining necessity 
under the Rational Connection approach is consistent with the 
administrative and corporate law theories of the Clause’s 
origins.190  Recall Professors Lawson and Seidman’s theory that 
an administrative interpretation of necessity requires efficacy, 
measuredness, and proportionality.191  These qualities are all 
embodied in the Rational Connection approach.  The approach is 
effective because it gives Congress ample leeway in executing its 
enumerated powers.192  It is measured and proportionate as well 
because it requires that acts of Congress be “appropriate” and 
“plainly adapted.”193  Furthermore, the Rational Connection 
interpretation of “necessary” is consistent with the corporate law 
theory of the Clause’s origins.194  Recall Professor Miller’s 
observation that the term “necessary” appeared in corporate 
charters to protect against broad grants of authority to corporate 
legislative bodies, and to require that enacted rules be 
“reasonably closely adapted” to institutional goals.195  The 
Rational Connection approach radiates this same sentiment.  For 
 
186 Id. at 421. 
187 See supra Part III.A.1; see also Jinks v. Richland Cty., S.C., 538 U.S. 456, 
462; Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39. 
188 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 418. 
189 Id. at 415. 
190 See supra Part I. 
191 See supra Part I.B; see also Lawson & Seidman, supra note 23, at 141–42. 
192 See Jinks, 538 U.S. at 462 (declaring that the Court “long ago rejected the 
view that the Necessary and Proper Clause demands that an Act of Congress be 
‘absolutely necessary’ to the exercise of an enumerated power.” (emphasis in 
original) (citations omitted)). 
193 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
194 See supra Part I.C. 
195 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
2019] THE “RATIONAL FEDERALIST” 171 
example, in Gonzalez, Justice Scalia avers that under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause it is critical that “the means chosen 
are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate 
end . . . .”196  In both instances, there is a means-ends fit required 
to keep the governing body’s power from going unchecked. 
Finally, the Rational Connection approach is useful in 
allowing Congress flexibility in its legislation.  Certainly, the 
framers anticipated some degree of flexibility to enable Congress 
to carry out its enumerated powers.  As James Madison wrote: 
“Without the SUBSTANCE of this power, the whole Constitution 
would be a dead letter.”197  Chief Justice Marshall, too, 
emphasized the importance of flexibility in a government 
intended to endure.198  The Rational Connection approach takes 
this into account.  By rejecting an unyielding reading of the word 
“necessary,” the Court allows Congress to adapt accordingly to 
both an ever-changing nation and an ever-shifting constitutional 
gestalt.199  Indeed, Marshall recognizes this: “[The Necessary and 
Proper Clause] is made in a constitution, intended to endure for 
ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various 
crises of human affairs.”200 
That said, this approach must be taken carefully.  As we 
have seen, the Rational Connection approach is an accordion 
concept and can be elasticized to allow Congress far more 
regulatory power than intended.201  Such a broad reading can be 
malleated to encapsulate a plethora of implied powers not 
otherwise found in the Constitution.202  However, it is crucial to 
remember that “the powers of the government are limited, and 
that its limits are not to be transcended.”203  Thankfully, the 
framers contemplated this by adding the phrase “and proper” to 
modify the word “necessary.”  Therefore, it is absolutely 
 
196 Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
197 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison) (emphasis in the original).  
198 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (declaring “we 
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.” (emphasis in 
original)).  
199 See Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional 
Gestalt, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2013). 
200 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415 (emphasis in original). 
201 See supra Part III.A.1. 
202 See Mikhail, supra note 4, at 1128. Mikhail concludes that “the Constitution 
vests unenumerated powers in the Government of the United States—and that 
Congress in turn is assigned the legislative authority to carry those powers into 
execution, by enacting laws ‘necessary and proper’ to that end.” Id. 
203 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. 
172 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:141   
imperative that courts do not forget the second prong of  
the inquiry mandated by Article I, § 8, Cl. 18 of the 
Constitution—that acts of Congress must be “proper.” 
B. Laws that are “Proper” 
The Federalist Restriction, although a slim inquiry, accords 
more weight to a law’s propriety than do the other three 
approaches.  This aspect of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
inquiry is crucial for three reasons: it creates an ostensible cap on 
Congress’s Article I power, it reflects the fiduciary and corporate 
shades proposed by Professors Natelson and Miller, and it 
remains homogenous with the Clause’s originally intended scope. 
First, the “proper” cap only allows the sheets of necessity to 
be pulled so far.  In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall made it 
abundantly clear that laws upheld under this Clause must “be 
within the scope of the constitution,” and “consist with the letter 
and spirit of the constitution”204 to be proper.  Yet, time and again 
the Court has upheld laws that are only remotely embodied in 
the Constitution—if at all—under the guise of “necessity.”205  
This is indeed foreboding for the principle “that ‘[t]he powers of 
the legislature are defined, and limited.’ ”206 
The Federalist Restriction protects against such legislative 
overreach by ensuring that laws which purport to carry out 
enumerated power are in fact proper exercises of congressional 
authority that do not otherwise intrude upon the province of 
states.  As illustrated by Printz and Alden, laws that can be 
stretched to reach an enumerated power nevertheless must be 
struck down if they usurp state power or try to fit the states into 
a federal mold.207  Rather, it is imperative that Congress does not 
deviate from traditional precepts of federalism.208  Without due 
respect to federalism, the “necessary” prong may be used to 
 
204 Id. 
205 See e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 142 (2010) (deriving a 
“federal custodian” power from the Restatement (2d) of Torts); United States v. 
Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 412 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Congress does not 
retain a general police power over every person who has ever served in the 
military.”). 
206 Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. at 415 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 176). 
207 See supra Part III.B.2. 
208 See Lawson & Granger, supra note 3, at 271 (positing that “proper” laws 
must “not usurp or expand the constitutional powers of any federal institutions or 
infringe on the retained rights of the states or of individuals”). 
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jettison enumerated powers in favor of a broad conception of 
implied, unenumerated power that permits laws merely for 
convenience or usefulness.209  Critically, the “proper” inquiry 
works as a bulwark to keep what is “necessary” from going 
unchecked. 
Second, the Federalist Restriction reflects the fiduciary and 
corporate colors that Professors Natelson and Miller suggest 
permeate the Clause.  Recall Professor Natelson’s agency law 
theory—if a fiduciary action extends beyond its scope of 
authority, the reasonableness of the action is irrelevant.210  The 
same concept applies in the Federalist Restriction.  If Congress 
legislates beyond its own powers and infringes upon the states, 
the necessity of that action becomes nugatory.211  Indeed, to act 
properly, Congress must not elasticize necessity to an extent that 
transcends the Tenth Amendment;212 otherwise it breaches its 
fiduciary duty to act as an agent of the people.  Furthermore, 
Professor Miller’s corporate theory is reflected under this 
approach. Recall that Professor Miller observed the use of 
limiting vocabulary attached to grants of power in corporate 
charters213 and posits that such terms served to protect against 
broad grants of power that could contravene state or federal 
law.214  The Federalist Restriction approach does essentially the 
same thing.  “Proper” serves as a limiting function upon the 
accordion concept of necessity to ensure that Congress does not 
exceed “the just bounds of its authority and make a tyrannical 
use of its powers.”215  Under both theories, it is essential that the 
legislature does not wrongfully exercise powers it does not 
possess. 
 
209 Id. at 331 (proclaiming that the Clause does not allow Congress “to regulate 
unenumerated subject areas to make the exercise of enumerated powers more 
efficient.”). 
210 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
211 See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 153 (2010) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“It is of fundamental importance to consider whether essential 
attributes of state sovereignty are compromised by the assertion of federal power 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause; if so, that is a factor suggesting that the 
power is not one properly within the reach of federal power.”). 
212 The Tenth Amendment states that: “The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
213 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
214 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
215 THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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Finally, the Federalist Restriction accurately reflects the 
scope originally intended for the Clause.  After the Constitutional 
Convention, there was strong push-back from anti-Federalists 
who feared that the Necessary and Proper Clause would enable 
the central government to abolish state legislatures, abolish state 
taxes, destroy state governments, and eventually lapse into 
tyranny.216  In response, the Federalists defended the Clause as 
mere surplusage—as adding nothing to the powers of 
government that was not already inherent within the 
Constitution.217  For example, in Federalist 33, Alexander 
Hamilton defended the Clause as “only declaratory of a truth 
which would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable 
implication from the very act of constituting a federal 
government, and vesting it with certain specified powers.”218  He 
believed that whether a law was proper “must always be 
determined by the nature of the powers upon which it is 
founded.”219  This is a clear indication that congressional action 
pursuant to the Clause could only serve the powers expressly 
enumerated.  Hamilton presented the Clause as a superfluous 
one that granted Congress no additional substantive power.  In 
fact, he averred that the Clause “though it may be chargeable 
with tautology or redundancy, is at least perfectly harmless.”220  
Conceptions such as these indicate that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause was never intended to bestow vast implied powers 
upon Congress.221  The Federalist Restriction ensures that it does 
not.  By championing the “proper” analysis, it ensures that “the 
powers reserved to the States consist of the whole, undefined 
residuum of power remaining after taking account of powers 
granted to the National Government.”222 
 
216 See Kurt Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth 
Amendment, Popular Sovereignty, and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1889, 1895 (2008). 
217 See Natelson, supra note 5, at 99. 
218 THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton). 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 See Lash, supra note 216, at 1895. But see Mikhail, supra note 4, at 1050 
(arguing that the Clause “necessarily refers to certain implied or unenumerated 
powers that the Constitution vests in the Government of the United States itself.”). 
222 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 153 (2010) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
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Ultimately, it is this limited scope of the Clause espoused by 
the Federalists that might tend to taint McCulloch’s crown.223  
Federalist supporters of the Constitution were steadfast in their 
conviction that it only granted expressly enumerated powers to 
Congress224—not the “vast mass of incidental powers” that Chief 
Justice Marshall uncovered.225  Breaking from the traditional 
representations of the Constitution’s advocates,226 McCulloch 
embraced a broad conception of implied federal power.227  The 
Federalist Restriction, however, restores a limited scope to the 
Clause.  By emphasizing the propriety of congressional action, it 
ensures that Marshall’s “vast mass of incidental powers” is not so 
vast that it usurps those powers reserved to the States and to the 
people.  This is imperative, since “the precepts of federalism 
embodied in the Constitution inform which powers are properly 
exercised by the National Government in the first place.”228 
Ultimately, this often overlooked yet vital inquiry ensures 
that Congress is legislating pursuant to its enumerated powers.  
By creating a palpable limit on incidental power, reflecting the 
fiduciary and corporate aspects of the Clause, and staying true to 
the Clause’s scope as originally represented, the “Rational 
Federalist” approach mandates an effective standard for 
Necessary and Proper Clause interpretation. 
CONCLUSION 
Amidst four different categories of interpretation, there is no 
predictable outcome for laws enacted pursuant to the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.  It is unclear whether they require a mere 
 
223 See Lash, supra note 216, at 1891–92. Upon an original understanding of the 
Tenth Amendment, Professor Lash argues that McCulloch is “almost certainly 
wrong.” Id. at 1892. 
224 Lash, supra note 216, at 1892. 
225 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
226 See Lash, supra note 216, at 1895 (noting that “advocates of the Constitution 
assured the ratifiers in the state conventions that Congress would have only 
expressly enumerated powers”). 
227 Professor Lash frames the gravity of the McCulloch decision quite nicely:  
Marshall’s construction of federal power has been embraced so widely and 
for so long that it takes some effort to appreciate the radical nature of his 
argument. So long as a law is ‘calculated to effect’ any of the objects 
entrusted to the government . . . Congress could employ any means so long 
as they were not ‘prohibited’ by the Constitution—regardless of the degree 
of necessity. 
Lash, supra note 216, at 1944 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
228 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 153 (2010) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
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rational connection to an enumerated power, or whether they 
must pass a five-factor inquiry; whether anything more than one 
step away from an enumerated power is too much, or if a 
necessary law may usurp state power.  The answers to these 
questions remain shrouded in ambiguity—but they do not have 
to be. 
There is a way to provide the flexibility required for effective 
governance while preventing a potential leviathan.  A 
combination of the Rational Connection and Federalist 
Restriction approaches affords Congress an effective amount of 
leeway as to necessity, all the while keeping federal power 
reasonably compressed under the weight of propriety. 
 
